



THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE OF USES, AS AN ELEMENT
OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CONVEYANCE.
The alienation of real property anterior to the statute of uses
presents to the consideration of the legal student two remarkably
distinct and well defined periods. The earlier one was that of sim-
ple, unadulterated, legal ownership, and the 'extremest simplicity was
a controlling feature, both of the estates which might be created as
well as the method of their inception and alienation. The transfer
of landed estates was discouraged by cumbersome restrictions; no
right in land was recognized unless it was clothed with possession,
while possession ind ownership could only be conveyed to another
by the simplest method of transferring title ever known to the law-
open and notorious livery of seisin. The law rested thus for years,
but the wants of extending intercourse, and a growing commercial
spirit, were hostile to such status, necessitating a departure from
such unwieldy requirements, and effecting in the end a more com-
modious and suitable method of transfer. The courts of chancery-
and here begins the second period, and the birth of distinction
between equitable and legal ownership-at a date as early as the
reign of Edward III, or Richard II, began to recognize a double
ownership in lands, and then grew up a consequent discrimination
41
THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE OF USES,
between equitable arid legal ownership.' The equitable owner enti-
tled to the rents and profits of land, whereof another person had
the legal title and seisin, was possessed of an estate of which the
courts of chancery took cognizance under the name of "1 use." It
is possibly not a legitimate subject of inquiry in this behalf, whether
or not the incorporation of this doctrine upon the common law, was
a subtle attempt on the part of the ecclesiastical houses to evade the
statutes of mortmain. It is certainly, neither necessary or within
the province of this dissertation to trace the resemblance between
uses and the ancient fidei commi8sa; nor, still following in the
footsteps of the civil law, to discuss the introduction of the writ of
subpoena,' and how the estate at conscience, formerly dependent upon
probity and entreaty, became compellable by the courts of chan-
cery; nor still beyond all this, and despite the numerous petitions
for the abolition of the entire system, during the reigns of the 4th
and 5th Henrys, how prerogative and jurisdiction was assumed and
exercised, "here a little and there a little," and the system grew
into an enlarged and admirable science.
The progress of the jurisdiction in this regard may be briefly
stated to be: 1. Pernaney of the profits. 2. Execution of estates.
8. Defence of the land:3 and the powers of jurisdiction being then
exhausted, the system began slowly to be elaborated and construed.
Though the religious houses had been concluded from acquiring the
use of lands, yet the advantages which this method presented, of
evading the hardships of the feudal tenure, of being devisable,
descendible and especially convenient for faihily settlements, so
strengthened in the public favor that almost the entire property of
England was held in this manner.4 Possessed of these advantages,
it was not however devoid of grievances. The cestui que use,
though generally in possession, was the merest tenant at sufferance:
the feoffments were secret, and he who had cause to sue for land,
knew not against whom to bring his action; the husband was barred
of his curtesy, the wife of her dower, the lord of his privilege, and
the creditor of his extent for rent. To remedy these inconveniences,
12 B. Com. 828. Inst. 2, 23, 12.
3Gilbert on U. & T. 1; Plowden, 352. 42 RoL Abr., 780.
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abundant statutes were passed, the intent of which was to remove
these objections, and to dispel the prevalent obscurity and confusion
of title, on account of which innocent purchasers were so frequently
defrauded., Legislators alarmed at the continuance of a system
which required such frequent enactments to repel its encroachments
upon the domain of common law prerogative, by the passage of a
statute in the reign of Henry the eighth, attempted to restore the
original simplicity of the common law, and terminate the existence
of this foundling doctrine which "1had for its parents fraud and
fear, and for its nurse a court of conscience."
The enactment, after reciting the grievances consequent upon
the law of uses as then understood and practiced-provided, 2 ", that
when any person shall be seised of lands, &c., to the use, confidence
or trust of any other person or body politic, the person or corpora-
tion entitled to the use in fee simple, fee tail, for life or years, or
otherwise, shall from thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed -
of the land, &c., of and in the like estates, as they have in the use,
trust, confidence, and that the estate of the person so seised to the
use shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in such
quality, manner, form and condition as they had before in the use.
"Up then to this time, according to Lord Bacon, a use was no
title, right or interest in law, neither jus in re nor ad rem, that is,
neither an estate nor a demand; it was nothing for which a remedy
was given by the courts of the common law, being a species of pro-
perty totally unknown to it, and for which, therefore, it was impos-
sible that it shouid make provision."
3
As the statute imports, it is in act for the transferring of uses
into possession. It executes the use eo instanti with the instrument
of conveyance, conveying the possession to the use, and transferring
the use into possession, making the cestui que use owner complete
both in law and equity. In so far as that instrument contemplated
the abolition of double ownership in real property, or the discon-
tinuance of this method of conveyancing, and a compulsory resort
II Rich. ii. 9; 4 Hen. vi. 17; 1 Hen. viii. 1; 19 Hen. 7, 15; 4 Hen. v. 7, 15;
1 Rich. iii. 1; 11 Hen. vi. 35.
227 Hen. viil 10. 'Bac. Read. 59; 1 Rep. 140, a.
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Q the older methods -of assurance known only to the common law,
it has signally failed in the accomplishment of its design. Viewing
it however, not as to the ends which it was originally intended to
compass, but as to the actual conveniences which it has aphieved it
has done much-very much. In consequence of the passage of that
statute, and the consequent exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of
common law over this branch of the law of real property, methods
of transferring landed estates have been originated which give to
that species of property almost equal facility of disposition with
negotiable paper. Effecting a greater revolution in the science of
jurisprudence than any which has occurred since the violent super-
induction of the feudal tenure upon the laws of the Anglo Saxons,
it has proven the foundation of a system of conveyancing, which
slowly elaborated and perfected by the teachings of every day
experience, has continued to the present day at least, prosperous
and strengthening. Having thus stated in as brief a manner as is
necessary for clearness and correctness, the English doctrine of uses
as left by that statute; turn we now to the other branch of our
subject touching the recognition of the statute and its English inter-
pretation by our courts, and the manner in which the theory which
pervades their law, is adopted and enforced in our own.
The principles of the common law concerning emigration are
among the most considerate and practical of its provisions. What
a sterling legal maxim is that which entitles English subjects going
to an uncivilized country to carry with them both the common and
statute law existing at the time of colonization ? How discreet the
theory that colonial infancy shall not be left to grope its way with
feeble and hesitating footsteps, first through the walks of the sim-
pler municipal regulations, and then through the mazes of more
extensive and entangling legislation, but at once and ever its growth
shall be encouraged, its weakness protected and its prosperity in-
sured, under the benign influence of a matured and healthy juris-
prudence, and under the protecting wgis of the British Constitu-
tion. Laying fast hold of that doctrine, it has never been ques-
tioned that English statutes passed before the emigration of our
ancestors, applicable to our situation, or in amendment or ameliora-
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tion of the common law, are part and parbel of the common law of
this country.' That the English law of conveyancing, both common
and amendatory, being wholly applicable to our situation, and in
the highest degree important, of necessity became our common law
is true, we think, beyond a peradventure. 2 We are not forced,
however, to trust solely to this vagua and unsatisfactory method of
determining whether the doctrine of uses, as settled by the passage
and interpretation of that statute is engrafted upon our system of
conveyancing. In a majority of the considerable commercial States,
the leading features of the statute 27 Hen. VII have been directly
recognized by decisions of the highest judicial authority and im-
portance. In some States, when it was thought dangerous to rely
solely on such a general adoption of statutes in matters of so great
moment as the efficacy of deeds and the tenure of estates, the
substance of the statute has been incorporated into their local
laws, and thus stability and certainty given to this branch of their
jurisprudence..
The task undertaken is, to examine how far the general theory
of that instrument, as well as its direct provisions have been adopted
in the several States. To borrow the words of Junius-" the con-
sideration of what is reasonable or unreasonable makes no part of
this qutestion. We are inquiring now, what the law is, not what it
ought to be. Reason may be applied to show the impropriety or
expediency of a law, but we must have either statute or precedent
to show the existence of it." 3 - By the examination of the adjudi-
cations of the judicial, and the enactments of the legislative depart-
ments, we hope to ascertain definitely as to the recognition, ppli-
cation and modification of such precedent and statute.
In New Hampshire, it has been held that the statute is not super-
seded by the acts of 1791 or 1701, but impliedly recognized by
them, and still in force.4 In Massachusetts the doctrine of uses
appears to have been recognized at an early day, and not disturbed
under the RI. S. of 1836, and in that State estates may still pass by
'2 Salk. 441; Jour. of Cong. Oct. 14, 1774; 5 Pet. 233.
26 Mass. 31; 2 Met: 118. 3Junius, Letter xvi.
4 3 .H. 234,432; 1 N. H. 232; 15 N. H. 462.
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way of use.1 The laws of conveyancing in Maine were derived
from the last mentioned commonwealth, and the legislative enact-
ments copied literatim. It follows as a necessary sequence that the
same operation is given to the deeds in each State, and to the due
construction thereof, the decisions of the parent commonwealth are
applicable.' Several direct adjudications are cited-from Connecti-
cut.,3 . In one of them a very elaborate opinion is given, in which
the court says: that the forms of their ancient conveyances show
satisfactorily that even in the earlier days of that State, it had been
.considered that the provisions of that statute were in force, since
those forms were such as had been brought into use in consequence
of the passage of that statute in England, and are more peculiarly
adapted to operate as consequences under its provisions than by the
common law. Latrobe says in his Justice, that it is with difficulty
the laws of Maryland concerning deeds can be succinctly collected
and made intelligible. We find in an old case involving no lessa
point than title to the province, that the people of that State have
* considered themselves, and the courts have adjudged them entitled
to the benefit of all the statutes of England antecedent to the set-
tlement of the province.' By the report of William Kilty, Chan-
cellor, in 1817, the statute was in full force and practice. The
legislature of New Jersey, in lieu of the statute itself, repealed
during the colonial existence, passed an enactment not identical
with the English statute, but it is thought embodying the theory
and expressive of the leading features of that instrument.6
In Virginia a statute has been adopted which executes the use in
the case of bargain and sale, lease and release, and covenant to
stand seised or deed so operating It is by the operation of this
statute, says a correspondent of Griffith's Law Register, that ihe
tenure of real property in this State is in a great measure regulated,
its influence not being less general and effective than in England.
In South Carolina the substance of the statute has been re-enacted,
4 Mass 135; 6 Mass 24. 5 Greenl. 232; see 32 1e. 329.
'Colony Records, ol. 1, 417, 43; a rby, 368; 1 Conn. 354; 16 Conn. 474.
42 H. & MoH. 279. 5 Report of Stat. 231. 6 R. B. (1847) 673, 17.
" Code (1849) 502, 114; 1 Lomax Dig. 188, 196; 8 Call 482.
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and the several assurances which operate under its provisions have
full force and effect.' In Alabama, by state enactment, convey-
ances by bargain and sale, lease and release, covenant to stand
seised, or deed so operating, suffice to pass the possession to the
purchaser, equally as if he had been enfeoffed with livery of seisin2
similar operation is given to deeds by statutes in several States: in
North Carolina,3 Kentucky,4 Florida,' Rhode Island,6 Mississippi,7
Massachusetts,8 Michigan, 9 and Indiana. 10  Of course a deed opera-
tive under the statutes of such States, dispenses with the theory of
raising a use, and executing it by force of the statute of uses, and
yet, that the system is a living and vigorous one despite the re-
straining influence of these local enactments, the reports of some
of the States we have just cited will abundantly establish. In Dela-
ware, it is briefly enacted that the ligal estate shall accompany the
use and pass with it." The provision of the statutes of Arkansas,
is almost the same, with the addition-as also in Pennsylvania and
Mississippi-that the words "bargain and sale," shall be held to be
an express covenant that the grantor is seised, &c.12  In Pennsyl-
vania, according to the very complete report of the judges of their
Supreme Court in 1808, the effective portion of that statute has
always been in force." In Iowa, 4 Georgia, 5 Illinois, 6 and Mis-
souri, 7 the essential portion of the statute is enacted and convey-
ances effected by virtue of the provision,-" that when any person
shall stand seised of lands to the use or trust of another, by reason
of any deed of bargain and sale, &c., the person entitled to such
use, trust, &c., shall be deemed in lawful estate and possession, and
the estate, right, title and interest, shall be in the person having the
use, trust, &c., in such like estates, and after such quality as they
had before in the use or trust."
12 Pub. Laws, 466; Grif. Law. Beg. 832; 2 M'Cord, 252.
2C1ay's Dig. (1843) 156, 35. 3 1 R. S. 259, c. 43, 4.
R. S. (1852) 196, c. 24, 4. 5 Thompson's Dig. (1847) 178, 4.
6 Pub. Laws, (1844) 260, 11. 7 How. & H. Dig. (1840) 349, c. 34, 26.
SR. S. (1836) 405, 1. 9 R. S. (1838) 257, 1.
10 1 R. S. (1852) 232, 4. 1 Stat. Del. (1829) 89, 1.
I-R. S. (1837) 188, c. 31, 1. 3 3 Binn. 619 App.
14 Laws (1839) 35, c. 28. ,5 Hotchkiss' Laws, 410, J 38.
161 R. S. (1856) 153, 3. 7 R. S. (1845) 218, 32.
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In California, Wisconsin and Texas, we are not able to find any
thing which will either directly establish or disprove the proposition
under investigation. In Tennessee, according to a late excellent
work upon conveyancing, there is a decision to the effect that the
statute has never been in force.' The statute of the state provides
that "all deeds, in what manner or form soever drawn, shall be
effective.2  In Louisiana, as the common law is not the basis of their
system of jurisprudence, we presume it is incontestible that the
statute does not obtain. In Vermont, notwithstanding an early de-
cision of the United States Circuit Court, that she, in common with
her sister New England States, had adopted the statute3 according
to the recent judgment of her supreme court of judicature, the
statute is not in force in that State,- and so says Chipman.- In
Ohio, upon a fair presentation of the question to the court, we find
it held-" that since the political organization of that State, they
can find no trace of the authority of this statute as a rule of pro-
perty, and no distinction is known in practice between uses and
trusts. The system of conveyancing, although it has grown out of
the English system, does not depend upon the statute of uses, but
has taken its form, and derives its authority from their own statutes
and local usages. Under such.circumstances the recognition of the
power of this statute is unnecessary and mischievous, introducing,
as it.would, new and complex rules of property."' 6 In New York,
the statute was recognized and applied for a great number of years,
and the accumulative learning upon this subject which their earlier
reports afford, bear faithful witness to the remark of the great mas-
ter of our science, that "the use in law hath not its fellow." Upon
the revision of their statutes years ago, objections were urged against
the system, so serious in the estimation of the general assembly
that uses and trusts, except as expressly authorized thereafter, were
entirely abolished.7 Every estate in lands is declared to be a legal
right, except as otherwise provided, and every estate held as a use
executed under any former statute, is declared to be a legal estate,
Thornton's Conveyancing, 482. 2 Car. & Nich. Dig. 598, 1.
3 Paine. . C. 536. 4 23 Vt. 600. 5 Chipman (Ed. 1793) 145, 146.
'7 Ham. (1st pt.) 275; Walker's Int. 310. 7 2 R. S. (4th Pd.) 136, 45.
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and all deeds operate as grants.' The wisdom or expediency of
this revision it is not our province to discuss. According to an
article in the American Law Magazine upon the subject, it has
effectually accomplished that change which it was the design of the
statute of uses to effect, the New York statutes passing the estate to
the remotest cestui, and executing the ultimate trust.
2
In order to raise a use, and have it executed according to the provi-
sions of the statute, there must be a competent person actually seised
to the use of the party beneficially entitled.3 Cornish divides the dis-
abilities thus,-incapacities of a personal nature, those arising from
tenure, and those springing from estate.4 Some of the old English
authorities attempted to create a subtle distinction between "giving
uses," and "standing seised to uses," but by our law it is thought
that every one-who is capable of taking lands by feoffment may be
seised to use. A corporation could not anciently stand seised,
although they might convey, but this distinction is regarded as a
refinement not fit to be practiced in this country, and with us the
word "person" of the statute is held to apply to corporations an
well as individuals.' Some of the conveyances under the statute
require adhesion to certain technical rules, as to the matter of
standing seised. For example, in the deed of covenant to stand
seised,'the person seised may be of the blood of the covenantor.
The use being synonymous with the legal estate, and the same
requirements necessary in the transfer, all those who may take
lands by common law assurances, may be the recipients of the use.
Indeed the practical theory which underlies the system of uses has
so ameliorated the hardships of the old common law rules concerning
alienation, that by way of use some may take lands, who were be-
fore incapacitated. A feoffinent or bargain and sale to one, for the
use of the wife of the feoffor, is executed under the statute, although
the husband could. not convey directly to his wife.7 When, how-
ever,- the conveyance is to the separate use of a feme covert she
may not take,8 although by the provisions of the New York statutes
'9 Barb. S. C. 324. 2 6 Am. Law Mag. 268. 3 Bac. Read. 41.
1 Cornish on U. 68. 52 Leon. 121, 3 id., 176. r11 Wheat. 392; 2 How.S.C.497.
71 San-leis on U. 95; 16 Conn. 474; 20 Johns. 85; 3 Wils, 23.
1l6Pick 330; 4 A. & E. 582.
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it would seem she might.' As was before remarked, in a deed of
covenant to stand seised, one not of the blood of the covenantor,
cannot take the use. The statute provides for a cestui que use in
esse, when therefore there is a disability, as a company unincorpo-
rated, or a person under some temporary incompetency, the feofees
take the estate until such time as the disability is removed, when
the statute executes the use and the estate vests.2 The statute
also makes necessary a use in esse, in possession, reversion or re-
mainder, and the word "seised" of the statute applies to all free-
hold estates. It had been adjudged that as the statute of uses
in Virginia did not make mention of this word, it was comprehen-
sive enough to embrace terms for years . The position was ably
refuted by Lomax.' As to the kinds of property which may be
conveyed, the statute itself provides for the alienation of "lands,
tenements and hereditaments," and enactments of the several states
have usually followed such provision. Bacon says that a use is to
be understood only of those things whereof an inheritance is in esse.5
No use can be conveyed in lands of which the grantor is not actually
or constructively seised in possession, reversion or remainder, for
every such disfusal implies of necessity a precedent possession. The
estate of a mortgagor may be conveyed to uses,6 but the interest of
a mortgagor, though generally a legal seisin as against the mort-
gagor, is not capable of being transferred, so as to be executed by
the statute.7 Nothing whereof the use is inseparable from the pos-
session-quae ipso usu consumuntur-can be granted. If the use
conveyed is greater than the estate out of which the statute serves
the seisin, it will cease upon the determination of the precedent
estate, but will be good for that time.8 Brief space will suffice to
notice the old common law methods of assurance as made applicable
under the system of uses. The more ancient and commion of them
is the deed of feoffment, and the distinctive feature of its operation
is the notorious livery of seisin, which is necessary to convey title.
Though in most of the states it is still a lawful, yet it is an exceed-
13 Barb. C. 632; lid. 220. 2 4 Wend. 494; 1 Greenl. 271; 5 W. & S. 323.
3 3 Call, 482. 41 Lomax' Dig. 188. 197. 6 Bac. Read. 43.
6 1 M'Cord, Ch. 289. 713 Penn. 98. 81 Atkyns, 523.
AN ELEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CONVEYANCE. 651
ingly unusual mode of alienation, and the registry of our deeds
stands in lieu of livery of seisin. Anciently, by this form of convey-
ance, the feoffee took the legal estate, but now feoffees to use have no
interest or estate at all, but in respect of the contingent estate and
uses limited in the deed, "they are but conduit pipes to lead the
uses."'  When a use is raised by feoffment, the feoffor having parted
-with the legal possession, out of which the statute serves the seisin,
cannot stand seised to the use of the feoffor, as the bargainor or
covenantor who retain in themselves the legal seisin and estate.
2
Cases of feoffinent to use, we find but rarely in the books, they
being generally not construed as such, unless to carry out the inten-
tion of the parties, which would otherwise be frustrated. The few
decisions which the reports afford are based on general leading prin-
ciples, easily capable of elementary compression, and valuable
especially for their learning as to the construction of deeds.3 The
deed of lease and release, although the customary method of aliena-
tion in England, as it does not require the trouble of enrollment,
has grown quite into disuse in this country. Contained in two
instruments of conveyance, it has the effect of but one. The lessee
estate being created by lease, of bargain and sale, the use being
executed in the lessor without entry, the freehold which then vests
in thereleasor by way of enlargement, being an estate at common
law, which does not require the aid of the statute to execute.4  As
the first conveyance has all the characteristic qualities of a deed of
bargain and sale, and is like it, a mere contract to convey, the
examination of that species of conveyance will suffice for this. The
dead of bargain and sale is a real contract, by -which the bargainor
"bargains and sells," that is eiontracts to convey to the bagainee
and thus becoming trustee for, or seised to the use of the bargainee,
the statute completes the purchase. The bargain first raises the
use, and the statute vests the possession, making complete the
seisin, without livery or entry.5
To render a bargain and sale deed capable of execution by the
statute, there must be an estate out of which a use can be raised,
I Noy's Tenures, 15. 2 8 Conn. 518.
3 4 Mason, 45; 3 Pick. 521 ; 9 Cowcn. 437. 4 1 Wash. C. C. 70.
5 10 Johns. 456; 8 Granch, 229; 2 Inst. 671.
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and then a valuable, consideration and words competent to raise a
use. No precise form of words is necessary, if they actually amount
to a present contract of sale. The words "remise, release and quit
claim,1" "release and assign," "for value received," and "make
over and confirm," will answer to raise a use by way of bargain and
sale.1 As to the consideration requisite-if a valuable one be proven
it is competent to raise a use, although it be unexpressed.2 Without
such consideration the deed cannot operate.3  Only the first use
arising in a bargain and sale is executed, for no use can be served
out of the possession of the bargainee to a third person, he can only
be seised of the land to his own use, and in him-alone can the legal
estate be vested by the statute.' In Pennsylvania, by act of Gene-
ral Assembly, 1715, such deeds have the same effect for giving
seisin and possession as feoffments, and as is the case with that
species of conveyance, the use raised may be executed in any one
in whose' favor it is expressly declared by the deed.- The authori-
ties are in conflict as to whether a freehold to begin in futuro can
be created by deed of bargain and sale. In Massachusetts, and the
New England States generally, it is held that a use takes instanta-
neous effect in the bargainee; the statute has then exhausted its
jurisdiction, the only seisin out of which a use might be raised has
passed from the bargainor, and nothing of energy remains in the
statute to execute the use at the time limited. 6 In New York, the
opinion of the court is stated to be that the seisin does not pass
from the bargainor at the execution of the deed, but abides in him
until the contingency happens, or the limited period has expired,.
and then the operation of the statute completes the purchase.7 -Of
this opinion is the learned commentator on American law."
By the deed of covenant to stand seised, a person seised of lands,
covenants that he will stand seised of them to the use of another.
On executing the conveyance, the other party becomes entitled to
the use of the land according to the stipulations of the instrument,
110 Johns. 456; 3 Id. 484; 18 Id. 60. 2 1 Cowen, 622. 3 16 Johns. 515.
4 16 Johns. 304; Sanders on U. 864; 1 N. H. 65; 3 Johns. 388.
5 4 W. &S. 192. 6 4 Mass. 235; 12 Id. 90; 22 Pick. 376.
7 1 Johns. Cas. 96; 3 Wend. 235; 20Johns. 87; 9vend. 611. 84Kent's Com. 298.
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and the possession and ownership is presently annexed to the use,
and words will suffice to constitute this deed, which sufficiently indi-
cate the intention. " Having the same effect as a deed of bargain
and sale, there is an essential difference in the considerations neces-
sary to support the two. Founded as it is on the consideration of
blood or marriage, this deed of covenant to stand seised can only
be.effective between relatives, and no use can be raised for any
purpose in one not within the influence of the domestic considera-
tion.2  The existence of a consideration other than that of blood or
marriage d6es not impede the operation of the deed. Collateral
consanguinity has been decided not to be a sufficient consideration
to support the deed.3 It is not essential that the consideration
should be named in the deed, if it appears upon iti face, or can be
inferred from the relations of the parties,4 for if the consideration
of blood or marriage is at all necessary to support the deed, it is to
be presumed when the fact of such consanguinity actually exists, 5
and the law even allows relationship to be averred and proven as
the operating and controlling consideration, although a different one
may be embraced in the deed, and no mention made of the existing
consanguinity. 6 Property may by this method of alienation be
conveyed directly from husband and wife.7 Estates to commence
infutuero may be and are usually created by this conveyance.8 So
a bargain and sale for a pecuniary consideration will operate as a
covenant to stand seised to the use of the party within the pale of
the consideration in order to effectuate the intention of the bargainer
without any techhical words for that purpose.9 A deed reserving
to the grantor the use and improvement of land during his life,
operates as a covenant to stand seised to his own use during life,
and after death to the use of covenantees and their heirs.1" This
species of deed duly recorded cannot be limited in its effect by a
subsequent deed from the grantee to a third person, nor by such
'Willes, 637; 1 Sand. Ch. 258. 2 16 Johns. 575; 22 Wend. 140.
' 1 Cowen, 622. 4 1 Johns. Cas. 91; 8 N. H. 234.
r 7 Pick. 115; 20 Johns. 85; 4 Taunt. 20; 12 Mass. 95. 6 18 Pick. 397.
7 2 Wils. 23; 16 Conn. 474. '7 Mass. 384; 18 Id. 339; 4 Cowen, 427.
9 11 Conn. 545; 4 Mass. 135; 20 Johns. 85. 10 1 Conn., 354; 3 N. H. 432;
3 Wend. 233.
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deed is the possession of the grantor converted into one adverse to
the covenantee.1  A deed which is inoperative as a feoffment for
want of proof of livery of seisin, or a release, if there be no lease
to make it valid, or a deed of bargain and sale impeached for want
of consideration, even in contradiction to its expressions, would
still be operative as a covenant to stand seised, and pass the estate
to the party entitled.2
It is requisite for the operation of the statute, and the execution
of the use, that there should be a person seised to the use of some
other lerson, a cestui que use in esse, and a use in esie in posses-
sion, reversion or remainder. To persons in esse the legal estate
is executed immediately, and as to persons not in esse, it will vest
presently upon their coming into being. 3 Whether the use will be
executed, depends very much upon the intention of the parties, as
evidenced by the instrument of conveyance. If the party seised to
the use is simply to hold to the use of the cestui, then the statute
executes the use into possession, but when it is necessary to the
due execution of the trust imposed that the legal estate should
remain in the hands of the person seised to the use, and when he is
unable to perform the duties appurtenant to such trust other than
by possessing a legal estate, in such cases the use remains unexe-
cuted, and the doctrine of trusts, with its multifarious learning, is
to be applied to its due construction. 4 When a conveyance of land
is made "for the sole use and benefit" of a feme covert, it has long
been well established that as the intention is to give an interest,
separate in the wife and beyond the control of the husband, such
provision is not an executed use, but a technical trust.5 This is
fairly expressive of the theory of the statute that the legal estate
given must be commensurate with the use, and that if it only has
the power to serve out a legal estate of precisely the same compass
as was possessed before in the trust and confidence. Or, as the rule
is laid down by the New York courts, "by the common law as well
as by the statute, the trustee takes only that quantity of interest
14 Munf. 473. 2 1 Har. & John. 627; 6 Paige, 526.
32 Wash. 9; 4 Wend. 49. 4 1 N. H. 232; 12 Pick. 152; 1 Hll, 413.
6l Hill onR. P. 300; 1 N. H. 65; 16 Pick. 327; 4A. &E. 582.
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which the purpose of the estate requires, and the instrument creating
the use expressly demands or constructively permits.'
Whenever there is in esse a cestui que use, a well defined use and
a seisin out of which the use may be served, the operation of the
statute then ensues, the possession of the vendor is transferred-to
and becomes the possession of the purchaser eo instanti with the
execution of the instrument of conveyance, and the property is
wholly and at once legally vested in the person beneficially entitled.
2
When theie is no suspension of the authority to' alienate, the real
intention of the party creating the use will in all cases be carried
into effect. When the trust is passive, the design is accomplished
by giving the cestui a legal estate; when active, by construing it
to be a power in trust, if it cannot take effect as a technical trust.3
The statute executes none but the first use, the seisin out of which
the estate is passed is then exhausted,' but it will execute any num-
ber of uses, one after another as they arise.5 When a conveyance
may take effect at common law or under the statute, it operates at
common law, unless the intention of the parties points adversly,
and when the party seised to the use and the cestui is the same
person, he never taketh by the statute unless there be a direct im-
possibility or impertinency for the estate to take effect by the com-
mon la'w.6
We have before noticed, in speaking of the estates which may be
conveyed to uses under the English system, that they may be limited
in fee, for life or years, and that the same position stands good in
the American law the books furnish abundant decisions. 7  There
are also certain technical requirements touching those to whom uses
shall be limited by deed of bargain and sale, covenant to stand
seised, &c., and we have before mentioned that a limitation of a use
upon a use is not executed. In many instances the courts have not
followed the peculiar rules of the common law concerning the limi-
tations of use, but adhering to the doctrine that the statute executes
after that "form, quality and condition as the cestui had in the
14 Denio, 385; 21 Wend. 147; 3 Corns. 525. 2 13 Penn. 98; 1 Selden, 455.
3 3 Sandf. S. C. 174. 4 9 Cowen, 437; 16 Johns. 304. r 10 Gill & 3. 443.
63 Md. 505; 3 Johns. 388. 7 Eirby, 368; 9 Paige, 107; 10 Id. 266.
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use," have originated limitations of estate totally unknown to the
simplicity of the earlier law. Springing uses are limited to arise
on a future event when no precedent estate is limited, and when
they do not take effect in derogation of any preceding interest, the
operation of the statute being as it were in abeyance until the use
should arise.' Thus a freehold may be conveyed to begin infuturo,
and the limitation is good by way of springing use.' When, how-
ever, there is an estate precedent capable of supporting a remainder,
then it is to be construed as a remainder, and not a springing use.8
Shifting or secondary uses are those which take effect in derogation
of some other estate. They are common in family settlements, and
are either limited by the deed creating them or authorized to be
appointed by some person named in it.4  The use limited to change
by matter post facto or a use to arise hereafter in lieu of another
limited in the mean time, as when in a deed a fee is given to two
grantees, with a proviso that in case one shall die before a certain
time, his estate shall go to the other, the instrument cannot operate
as a common law conveyance, because it limits an estate upon a fee,
but the limitation takes effect by way of shifting or secondary
use.5 Future uses are common, and take effect i2 future in dis-
tinction from those which vest.in a certain person presently. Con-
tingent uses are future, with still the difference that they depend
upon the happening of some event. Kent says, they are limited to
take effect as remainders. 6 Cornish draws the distinction, contin-
gent uses and remaiiders, at great length and with much technical
learning.' Fearne says, they may always take effect as remainders
when limited upon a prior particular estate which it does not in-
fringe, and possessed of the two qualifications necessary in a re-
mainder, dependence upon a prior particular estate, and expectancy
on its determination. 8 If the limitation by deed expires, cannot be
executed, or was not to vest but upon the happening of a contin-
gency, the use results back to the grantor creating it, for so much
Mutton's Case, Dyer, 276, (b).
24 Mass. 135; 2 Wills. 75; 18 Pick 339; 9 Wend. 611.
32 Doug. 757; 22 Pick. 376; 1 Conn. 354. 4 1 Leon. 264 7 Pick. 11.
5 20 Johns. 85; 3 N. H. 432. 6 4 Kent's Com. 298.
' Cornish, 164. 'Fearne on Con. Rem. 11-20.
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of the use as the owner of the land does not dispose of, remains still
with and in him.'
Executed uses being no more liens on probity, but ownership in
land, and possessing all the properties of legal estate are of course
subject to all debts and liabilities consequent upon such ownership.
Having such properties, a use in esse cannot be destroyed by the
alienation of the person having the seisin of the land.2 Nor can
the grantor in a deed of covenant to stand seised by giving convey-
ance to a third person, convert his possession into one adverse to
that of the covenantor. 3 In respect to future contingent uses, there
must be a person seised to the use when the contingency happens,
if they are to be executed; and if the estate of the feoffee to such
uses be destroyed by alienation or otherwise before that contingency
happens, the use is also destroyed.
4
If we are at liberty to draw any conclusion from the preceding
pages, we think it to be a safe one, that the system of uses in the
American, as well as the English law, has insinuated itself deeply
and thoroughly into all the regulations touching the alienation of
real property. Formerly, used as a method of conveyancing to
defraud creditors and keep the ownership of property uncertain and
concealed in direct violation of the principles of the dominant tenure,.
which held that alienation should be open and ownership notorious,
the system perhaps merited much of the objection which was urged
against it. By pursuing uses from plain principles into all their
consequences, and by occasional assistance from the legislative de-
partment, we think a nobler, rational, and as far as may be, a uni-
form system of law has been since established. Cestui que use no
longer possessing a mere jus precarium, but having all the rights
and subject to all the liabilities of legal ownership, and notoriety of.
transfer being effectually supplied by our registry laws, the system
is made to answer all the demands and exigencies which may arise
without producing aught of the fraud, inconvenience or private
mischief meant by the statute to be avoided. Though the original
design of that instrument may have been departed from widely, and.
1 16 Conn. 484; 18 Pick. 397; 3 Johns. 388. - 1 Johns. Cas. 91.
3 4 Munf. 437. ' 4 Kent's Com. 387; 22 Pick. 376.
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though the machinery primarily intended to destroy the powers of
an aristocratic clergy, is now used for the comparatively humble
function of transmitting property from individual to individual, yet
it has lost nothing of its dignity or usefulness. As to some of the
old conventional prejudices and unwieldy requirements of the com-
mon law concerning the transfer of property, it has effected a com-
plete though stealthy revolution, and inducted in lieu thereof pro-
visions and conveyances, than which none are more necessary or
practical. It stands also a dernier resort to effectuate conveyances
by force of its energy when the machinery of the common or statute
law proves unavailing. That courts have been compelled to have
recourse to this doctrine in order to carry out the intention of the
parties and effectuate conveyances void under the State statutes,
the reports of Maine, New Hampshire, Delaware, North Carolina
and others stand for example. The doctrine of uses forming then
no inconsiderable portion of our law of conveyance, most of the
panegyric which has been lavished upon the system by the English
jurists, on account of the inconveniences prevented, the grievances
concluded, and the open and practical method of transfer which it
originated and perfected, is applicable to us. With reference to
those States where the system is unrecognized or expressly abolished,
we may say but a word. For the abrogation of the system, the
objection most clamorously, and it would seem most successfully
urged, has been that it perpetuated a great mass of useless require-
ments and technical jargon, and its abolition -would to a great
extent relieve the law of real property of its abstruseness and un-
certainty. While it is very questionable whether in this crusade
against the system of uses as now expounded and enforced, " the
vigor and success of the war will come quite up to the lofty and
sounding phrase of the manifesto," very certain it is, that the en-
deavor to abolish entirely what is termed the technical language
and peculiar erudition of the law is both idle and useless. It is a
judgment most imperfect to suppose that a scien~e which is defined
to be "1 the last effort of hum'an intelligence acting upon human
experience," struggling to combine inflexible rules with transactions
and relations perpetually changing, the development of which has
